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Abstract 
Code injection attack has become a typical representative of the attacks against memory, buffer overflow attacks 
which is the most commonly used. It relies on the change of control-flow, let the program point to the malicious code 
in order to obtain the root rights. This paper presents a method using randomization based on data protection, through 
the protection of pointers and arrays to defend buffer overflow attacks effectively. 
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1. Introduction  
Buffer overflow attacks are always the cyber-attacks with high level of safety hazard, attacks caused 
by buffer overflow vulnerabilities account for most of software vulnerabilities and operating system’s 
vulnerabilities [1]. So far, there have been several methods to protect against buffer overflow attacks, 
except bound checking[2], there isn’t a perfect way to solve all the buffer overflow attacks. Most methods 
are adopted to protect some of the buffer overflow vulnerabilities [3~6], attackers can still succeed by 
passing the protection. For example, StackGuard [13, 14] can only protect the direct stack overflow attacks, 
for non-stack overflow it can do nothing. In this paper, we use the randomization on the array and pointer 
variables in the program space to protect the buffers, point data and return address, this work achieves on 
the source level to protect the attacks caused by buffer overflow vulnerabilities. 
2. Targets of Buffer Overflow Attacks 
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The attacks using buffer overflow exploits are based on the priori knowledge of the memory 
distribution in program space. The fundamental reason of buffer overflow attacks lies in the insecurity of 
C and C++ language, the memory operations are considered the performance first without bound 
checking. Generally speaking, the goal of buffer overflow attacks is to load the attacker’s code with 
carefully designed, then the attacker can gain the system permissions. The objects which change the 
program control-flow using overflow form are also the goals of buffer overflow attacks. There are three 
kinds of targets: 
2.1 function return address 
When the function call ended and the return address is called, the program will jump to code segment 
which the covered return address pointed to (malicious code segment). Function return address is the first 
choice of procedure attacks. 
2.2 function pointer 
Similar to the function return address, function pointer can also directly affect the program control-
flow. when the pointer is covered though the near buffer, the next time function pointer is called, the 
program will be able to jump directly to the malicious code segment. Function pointer is an important 
target of procedure attacks. 
2.3 PLT/GOT table 
PLT and GOT achieve the dynamic relocation of the program together. Essentially, GOT is one kind 
of function pointer. Simply, if the GOT is covered by its adjacent buffer, the address which GOT points to 
maybe the entry of malicious code. PLT/GOT are also the important target of procedure attacks. 
3. Data  Randomization Method 
3.1 Thought of data randomization 
We understand that the objects covered after the buffer overflow have three types: return address, 
function point and GOT. In this paper, we introduce a new method using data randomization, protect the 
array and pointer using xor encryption with a mask of a 32-bit random number. When the overflow 
happened, the target is an encryption value, so the malicious code can’t be pointed to, the attack failed. 
Our approach is based on the source level transformation of C programs. When program is initializing, 
for each array data or pointer data variable A, we introduce another variable MA which stores the mask 
value to be used for randomizing. The mask is a 32-bit random number which generated at the beginning 
of program execution for static variables, and at the time of memory allocation for stack and heap 
variables. Thus, after every statement that assigns a value to a variable A, we add the statement A=A^MA 
to randomize the value of the variable in the memory. Also, wherever an array variable or a pointer 
variable is used, its value if first derandomized. We can see Example 1 to understand how data 
randomization method works. 
Example 1: … 
copy(char *msg) 
{ 
char buffer[512]; 
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strcpy(buffer,msg); 
} 
main(int argc,char *argv[]) 
{ 
                if(argc>1) 
copy(arg[1]); 
} 
The program’s memory allocation  is shown in Figure 1. 
. 
. 
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return address
previous fp 
buffer[511] 
. 
. 
. 
buffer[0] 
. 
. 
. 
Figure 1. Memory allocation figure 
When call the function copy(), the parameters, return address, the former stack pointer, local variables 
will pushed into the stack in turn. If the overflow data’s value is C, then we can see that the return address 
stored in the memory must be C⊕MA⊕MB. When copy() return to main() function, the return address 
point to the address value  C⊕MA⊕MB, which is different from C as long as we ensure MA≠MB. By 
using different masks for different variables , we can ensure that even if the attacker manages to overwrite 
the return address, all the attacker would have accomplished is to write a random value into it, rather than 
being able to write the intended value C, so the attack failed. 
3.2 Pointer variable confusion 
So far, the transformation of array types doesn’t have problems, but a case in which pointer variable 
data is accessed indirectly by dereferencing pointers, as in the following C code Example 2. 
Example 2：Int a,b,c,*ptr 
 … 
ptr=&a; 
… 
ptr=&b; 
… 
c=*ptr; 
In Example 2, the exprssiong *ptr is an alias for ether a or b. Since *ptr is used in the statement: c=*ptr, 
we need to unmask it before using its value in the assignment. Therefore, the stored value in our method 
is Maskc⊕(Maska⊕a) or Maskc⊕(Maskb⊕b), we can’t distinguish clearly. Our solution to the problem 
is using static analysis.  
sp 
fp 
attack code 
memory 
growth 
1760  Yan Fen et al. / Physics Procedia 24 (2012) 1757 – 1764
Author name / Physics Procedia 00 (2011) 000–000 
 
3.3 Point analysis 
Due to the generation of pointer confusion, we need to use pointer analysis [7] technology to determine 
the program’s control-flow. There are several factors that affect precision and efficiency of analysis: 
flow-sensitivity, context-sensitivity, modeling of heap objects, modeling of aggregate objects, and 
representation of alias information. We choose Steensgaard’s algorithm [8, 9] to do the pointer analysis 
considering above factors. Through Example 3 to analyze the pointer analysis of  Steensgaard’s algorithm. 
Example 3:void steensgarrd(int **a1){…} 
a2=&a4; 
a3=&a5; 
a3=&a6; 
… 
steensgarrd(&a2); 
steensgarrd(&a3); 
After using Steensgaard’s algorithm, we can divided pointers into different equivalence classes, and 
the point-to graph by analyzing equivalence class are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Point-to graph 
Steensgaard’s algorithm needs to classify the point-to relationship of pointers. In Example 3, there are 
three kinds of equivalence classes, we can get these three classes: 
{a1},{*a1,a2,a3},{**a1,*a2,*a3,a4,a5,a6}, all the nodes in these three classes have the same mask value. 
3.4 Mask assignment 
In Example 3, according to the point-to graph, there are three kinds of equivalence classes, so first sign 
Maska1 to a1, then we find that *a1,a2,a3 are in the same class, a2 and a3 have the same mask Maska2, at 
last we find that **a1,*a2,*a3,a4,a5,a6 are in the same class too, so a4,a5,a6 have the same mask Maska4. 
As the mask value is a random number, stored in the corresponding static variable MASK, when 
pointer analysis is completed, we then allocate the number of static variable MASK by the number of 
encrypt objects.  
4. Experiments and Analysis 
4.1 Experiment environment 
We achieve our approach on a 32-bit x86 architecture and Linux operating system. We use CIL [10] as 
the front end, and Objective Caml as the implementation language. The following example shows us the 
main work of our approach. 
1) C program source code 
int Array[512]; 
int *A1,*A2,**A3,**A4,node; 
a1
a2,a3
a4,a5,a6
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int main() 
{Array[512]={1} 
      A1=&node; 
      A3=&A1; 
      A4=A3; 
      A2=*A3; 
      …=&A3;} 
2) point-to graph for C  code 
 
Figure 3. Point-to graph of C code 
3) Transformed code for C code 
stactic unsigned int mask1,mask2,mask3,mask4; 
int Array[512]; 
int **A1_1,*A2,***A3_1,**A4,*node_1; 
int main() 
{Array[512]={1^mask1} 
  (*A1_1)=node_1; 
      A3_1=A1_1; 
  (*A4_1)=A3_1; 
(*A3_1)=(int **)(unsigned int)(*A3_1^mask2); 
      A2=(int *)((unsigned int)(*((int **)((unsigned int)(*A3_1^mask3)))^mask2);} 
4.2 Buffer overflow attacks test 
Table 1 describes the test platform Wilander, it includes 18 kinds of buffer overflow attacks. From the 
attack view, they can be divided into two kinds, one is a direct overflow attack, it covered the value of the 
object directly through the buffer, in front of all 8 kinds are direct overflow attacks; the other is a indirect 
overflow attack, that is first cover the value of a point through the buffer, then change the target’s value 
through the assignment of program itself, so as to achieve the purpose of exploits, the latter 10 kinds are 
indirect overflow attacks. From the storage location of attacks target, the attacks can be divided into two 
classes: stack overflow and heap overflow. We test these 18 kinds attack using our data randomization 
approach, test result are shown in Table 1 as follows. 
Table I. Result of Wilander test 
Attack 
Technology
Attack 
Type Attack Target Attack Description 
Defensive
or not 
Buffer 
Overflow 
Attack 
Stack 
direct 
attack 
⑴return address overflow buffer to overwrite return address √ 
⑵stack pointer overflow buffer to overwrite base stack pointer √ 
⑶local function 
pointer overflow buffer to overwrite local function pointer √ 
A3(mask3)
A1(mask2)
node 
A2 
A4
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⑷functionpointer 
parameter 
overflow buffer to overwrite the input function pointer 
parameter √ 
⑸local Longjmp 
buffer overflow buffer to overwrite local Longjmp buffer √ 
⑹Longjmp buffer 
parameter 
overflow buffer to overwrite the input Longjmp buffer 
parameter √ 
Heap 
direct 
attack 
⑺function pointer overflow buffer to overwite the function pointer in the heap √ 
⑻Longjmp buffer overflow buffer to overwrite Longjmp buffer in the heap √ 
Stack 
indirect 
attack 
⑼return address overflow buffer to overwrite the pointer in the stack, then jump to overwrite the return address √ 
⑽stack pointer overflow buffer to overwrite the pointer in the stack, then jump to overwrite the stack pointer √ 
⑾local function 
pointer 
overflow buffer to overwrite the pointer in the stack, then jump 
to overwrite the local function pointer √ 
⑿functionpointer 
parameter 
overflow buffer to overwrite the pointer in the stack, then jump 
to overwrite the input function pointer parameter √ 
⒀local Longjmp 
buffer 
overflow buffer to overwrite the pointer in the stack, then jump 
to overwrite the local Longjmp buffer √ 
⒁Longjmpbuffer 
parameter 
overflow buffer to overwrite the pointer in the stack, then jump 
to overwrite the input Longjmp buffer parameter √ 
Heap 
indirect 
attack 
⒂return address overflow buffer to overwrite the pointer in the heap, then jump to overwrite the return address √ 
⒃stack pointer overflow buffer to overwrite the pointer in the heap, then jump to overwrite the stack pointer √ 
⒄function pointer overflow buffer to overwrite the pointer in the heap, then jump to overwrite the function pointer √ 
⒅Longjmp buffer overflow buffer to overwrite the pointer in the heap, then jump to overwrite the Longjmp buffer √ 
4.3 Evaluation 
We ran experiments to evaluate the overhead of the implementation of data randomization. Table 2 
and Table 3 show the CPU and memory space overhead on the SPEC CPU 2000 benchmark suite [11], the 
original and the transformed programs were compiled using gcc-3.2.2, and run on a desktop running 
RedHat Linux 9.0 with core 1.6GHz processor and 1G RAM. 
Table II. CPU performance overhead 
PROGRAM Overhead 
Gzip 18% 
Vpr 15% 
Mcf 7% 
Crafty 25% 
Parser 11% 
Bzip2 10% 
Twolf 6% 
Average 13% 
Table III. Memory space overhead 
PROGRAM Overhead 
Gzip 0.1% 
Vpr 0.3% 
Mcf 0.2% 
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Crafty 3.1% 
Parser 0.8% 
Bzip2 0.1% 
Twolf 2.0% 
Average 0.9% 
 
Compare to the technology of Address space randomization(ASR) [16-18], our work has a bit higher 
performance overhead, but with a higher intensity defense and a lower probability to be attacked. 
Compare to the approach of Instruction set randomization(ISR) [12,15], our approach has both lower 
performance and memory space overhead, but still can protect program against buffer overflow attacks. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed a new randomization based technology to defend against buffer overflow 
attacks. This method protects the buffers and the pointers using xor encryption, when the buffer is 
covered, the covered data is a random number that doesn’t point to the malicious code. Compare to the 
other randomization approach, our method has a lower performance loss, and a higher strength defense. 
This method also has a probability 2-32 to be attacked. In future work, we expect to enhance the strength 
of encryption to make it more difficult to be attacked with an affordable loss in performance. 
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